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In the Supreme Court
of the State of ,Utah

R. J. PENMAN,
Plaintiff wnd .Appellant,

vs.

THE EIMCO CORPORATION,acorporation,
Defendant and

Respovndew~.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The court rule, requiring respondent to indicate
whether he agrees with the statement of facts in Appellant's brief, in this particular case, presents a quandary
to the Respondent. As respondent views the ·pleadings
and testimony as presented in the trial court, most of
the relevant facts are without dispute. A reading of
appellant's brief fails to distinguish between the undisputed and dis~puted facts and is so arranged that respondent is lead to the conclusion that in the interest
of clarity, the rule of the court can best be served by
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restating the facts and particularly by segregating them
into the undisputed and disputed categories.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in the City Court of
Salt Lake City on September 27, 1945, in which he alleged
that the defendant became indebted to plaintiff for
''labor amounting to the sum of $1563.15 and a commission amounting to the sum of $84.55 for a total of
$1658.05,'' and that defendant has failed to pay any part
thereof ''save and except the sum of $849.60'' leaving
a balance of $808.45. (Tr. 13.) To this pleading the defendant filed an answer and counterclaim which as
amended alleged that the defendant became indebted to
the plaintiff in th·e sum of $2204.37, but th~t defendant
had advanced to plaintiff in connection with the work
done by plaintiff the sum of $2,519.42 CTr. 10) and in a
counter-claim defendant alleged that there was an agreement between plaintiff and defendant whereby ''defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $2.00 per ton for
transporting scrap material from the Tooele Ordinance
Plant to defendant's place of business in Salt Lake City
and plaintiff pursuant to said contract transported 1,669,822 pounds of said scrap' material, thereby earning under
said contract the sum of $1,669.82; that th·ereafter, said
contract was modified in that defendant agreed to pay
plaintiff the reasonable value of preparing certain channel iron, a part of said scrap material, and that plain.tiff
prepared channel iron, the reasonable value of such rpreparation being in the sum of $450.00. '' Defendant also
admitted that plaintiff earned and was entitled to the
sum of $84.55 as a commission on the sale of certain
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scrap n1aterial. Defendant's counter-claiin then alleges
that defendant had advaneed to plaintiff the sum of
$2,519.42 and that this "ras $315.10 n1ore than plaintiff
had earned, and prayed judgment for that amount. (Tr.
11.) No reply or other pleading 'vas ever filed by ·plaintiff to defendant's counter-claim. The case was tried in
the City Court, appealed to the District Court, the present appeal lies from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the orders and judgment made and
entered in the District Court.
The plaintiff and defendant had enjoyed business
relationships over a period of eight or nine years. (Tr. 68,
100.) During most of the time, the 'plaintiff had worked
for the defendant on a contract basis, sometimes on a
per-day basis. (Tr. 68.) 'In October, 1943, an oral contract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant
whereby the defendant was to haul certain scrap steel
from the Tooele Ordinance Plant to plaintiff's place of
business. At that time, plaintiff 'vas engaged in the
trucking business and equipped to haul heavy steel parts.
Plai~tiff was dealing with Simon Rosenblatt, who represented the defendant. He went to the Tooele Ordinance
Plant to view the scrap which was to he hauled into
defendant's place of business in Salt Lake. (Tr. 69.) The
scrap consisted of "large fiat plates, some smaller flat
plates, bolts and settings to put the igloo together,"
(Tr. 70) as well as some steel trusses used to sup~port
forms _in the construction of igloos. The trusses were
12 to 14 feet long (Tr. 73) had a five-inch channel iron
curved across the top, the two ends of the curve were
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tied together ·by 1%'' pipe or boiler tubing, and there
were three struts running from the center of the tie up
to the curved channel iron. (Tr. 74.)
The contract between plaintiff and defendant ·provided that plaintiff could haul the steel by either truck
or rail and for ·each ton delivered at defendant's place
of business he was to receive $2.00. ( Tr. 70.) If he
shipped it by rail, the plaintiff had to pay the freight
charges. (Tr. 71.)
Between October, 1943 and January, 1944 the plaintiff moved from the Tooele Ordinance Plant to defendant's yard in Salt Lake ·City around one and one-half
to two million pounds of scra'p steel. Some was moved
by truck and som·e by rail. ( Tr. 71.) That which was
moved by rail cost the plaintiff sixty-five (65) cents a
ton freight charges, if he loaded a car to its minimum
capacity. If the car was not loaded to its minimum, he
still had to pay the minimum charge for the car, which
increased the cost per ton. ( Tr. 103.) When plaintiff
came to haul the steel trusses, he found he could not load
sufficient to make up a minimum car and plaintiff knew
that when received at the defendant's yard, the trusses
were cut up into smaller pieces so that ·it could be remelted. ( Tr. 71, 72.) ·so in the first part of January,
1944 (Tr. 75) plaintiff went to Mr. Rosenblatt repres·enting defendant and according to plaintiff's testimony the
following happened:
Q.

And you went to Mr. Rosenblatt and suggested you could cut them as cheap as 'they
could cut them in their own yard~
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. A..

I didn't say as cheap. 'l said we could cut
them with a torch out there.

Q.

Did you say that would be as

A.

I don ~t think I mentioned the price. I said
when they come in the yard they would be
cut.

Q.

You thought by cutting it out there you
would get a greater tonnage?

A.

We knew it. (Tr. 72.)

cheap~

Q.. In order to get greater tonnage, it was to
your advantage because of the freight you
had to pay, wasn't that right?

A. Yes.
Q.

It was to your advantage to cut the trusses
at Tooele because you could get a greater
tonnage on your cars. Isn't that right~

A.

Yes. (Tr. 73.)

Mr. Ros-enblatt's testimony as to the same conversation
was recorded as follows :
Q.

He wanted to cut it up so he could load more
tonnage in the cars,~
·

A.

At his own benefit. ( Tr. 102.)

Q.

What did he say about

A.

I told him at first I didn't think he could do
it advantageously. He said he could cut it
much ch~aper out here in the yard than he
could out there, and he said he (sic.) would
make a greater difference by loading it in a
car-if he only got 30,000 in the car his
freight was $1.30 a car (sic.) instead of 65c
a ton.

that~
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What did you tell him'
A. I told him to go ahead and do that cutting
and we would make extra allowance to him
on the job when finished, based on our own
costs in our own yard.
Q.

Q.

Based on your costs'

A.

Yes, certainly.

Q.

You told him you wouldn't allow him to do
the cutting where the cost was greater than
it was in your· own yard'

A.

That is correct. err. 103.)

* * • •

Plaintiff proceeded to employ some torchmen to cut
up the trusses. He paid the men who used the torches
$1.00 an hour for straight time and $1.50 for over-time.
(Tr. 76.) The torchmen worked 304 hours straight time,
63 hours over-time. He paid common labor 80c an
hour ('Tr. 76) and they worked 133 hours at straight time.
He paid them $1.20 an hour for four hours over-time.
(Tr. 77.) He also purchased between $133 and $140
worth of acetylene (Tr. 78) and made four trips in
hauling acetylene and oxygen fro~ Salt Lake to Tooele.
Some of the trips were return hauls from delivering
scrap' steel and some were not, (Tr. 78) and plaintiff
testified that the reasonable value of the four trips was
$25.00 per trip or a total of $100.00. (Tr. 79.) There
was no dispute in the testimony concerning the number
of hours worked or as to whether they were paid for
at straight time or over-time. The difference was that
plaintiff sought to establish that the reasonable value
of cutting the trusses at Tooele should not be the amount
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\Yhirh he had to pay for labor, acetylene and oxygen, but
that cutters' \vages should be figured at $3.00 an hour
instead of the $1.00 paid, and $4.50 overtime instead of
the $1.50 paid, and that common labor should be $2.00
an hour straight time and $3.00 overtime. ('Tr. 64, 65, 69.)
About February 15, 1944, the oral contract upon which
the ·parties had been working came to an end because
~Ir. Penman \\~as not delivering the required tonnage.
He hadn't been on the job all the time and hadn't been
cutting any additional trusses or hauling any. (Tr. 108,
109.) During the term of the contract, that is, from
October, 1943 to February 15, 1944, Mr. Penman had
been paid by the defendant a total of $1800.00 in cash.
(Tr. 105.) These payments had been made at irregular
times, generally on Saturdays when he needed money to
meet payroll and pay bills. (Tr. 104.) In addition to
that, he had charged to the defendant materials, principally oxygen and acetylene to the amount of $163.02,
and the defendant had paid freight charges on rail shipments from Tooele to the extent of $556.40, making a
total advanced by defendant upon the contract during
the term thereof of $2,519.42. (Tr. 105.) On February
15, after the plaintiff had quit hauling, he met with Mr.
Rosenblatt, rep·resenting the defendant. Mr. Rosenblatt
presented to him a statement which is in evidence as
Exhibit ''A,'' showing the number of pounds of material
shipped by rail and that hy truck, cash advanced, and
that before any allowance was made for cutting the
channel pipe that the plaintiff was overdrawn to the
amount of $849.60. On the bottom of the statement
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appeared the following: ''Special allowance yet to be
ma.de for cutting channel ~pipes.'' From what the evidence discloses, this statement was accepted by plaintiff and not questioned, and plaintiff at no time ever
submitted to defendant a statement as to what he thought
was the reasonable value of services rendered in cutting
the pipe at Tooele. (Tr. 106.)
The foregoing, in the opinion of counsel for respondent, constitutes a statement of the undisputed facts as
disclosed by the pleadings and evidence as they relate
to the merits of the law suit as disposed of by the Honorable Clarence E. Baker . .Appellant, however, has by his
appeal questioned the order of the Honorable Roald
A. Hogansen entered June 16, 1947 (Tr. 26.) denying
plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal to the
District Court from the ·City Court of Salt Lake City.
The facts relative to this matter are as follows: The
judgment in the City Court was made and entered the
29th day of January, 1947. (Tr. 8.) No notice of judgment was ever served by plaintiff upon defandant.
On the 7th day of February, 1947, plaintiff duly
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County a notice of appeal. (Tr. 4.) At the same time
that the notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the
District Court, counsel for defendant tendered to the
clerk of the court the statutory filing fee for said appeal,
hut the clerk there and then refused to accept said filing
fee and alleged as grounds that the records from the
City Court had not yet been received from the clerk of
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the City (~ourt. The clerk agreed to notify eounsel for
defendant as soon as the record from the clerk of the
City Court had been received. The clerk never at any
time adYised counsel for defendant (Tr. 18, 19.) that
the record from the City Court had been received.
On I\la~y· 28, 1947, counsel for plaintiff, without notice
to defendant, presented a motion to dismiss defendant's
appeal from the City Court and the Honorable Roald
A. Hogansen entered an 'Order dis1nissing said app·eal
and ordering the files and records to be returned to the
City Court. (Tr. 3.) Thereafter, on June 5, 1947, defendant served and filed a motion to reinstate the appeal and
relieve defendant from default for failure to pay filing
fees as provided ·by law, on the grounds that notice of
plaintiff's motion to dismiss had not been served on defendant and upon other equitable grounds, which motion
was served upon counsel for plaintiff and an affidavit
setting forth, the tender of filing fee and the refusal of
the clerk to accept same, clerk's agreement to notify
counsel for defendant, and his failure to do so was served
and filed in support of said motion. (Tr. 18, 19.) On
June 11, ·the matter was argued before the Honorable
Roald A. Hogansen.
There is also in the file an Affidavit and Motion of
·plaintiff filed June 11, 1948. ( Tr. 23.) This asks the
court to dismiss the appeal. It does not show that notice
of this motion was given defendant, which accounts for
the vacuum in the transcript relative to the facts as they
exist at that time, and the reasons that motivated the
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judge in denying the motion. The Honorable Roald A.
Hogansen set aside the order dismissing defendant's
appeal and refused to grant plaintiff's motion of June
11 to dismiss the appeal. (Tr. 26.)

ARGUMENT
The first problem is to determine the terms of the
contract sued upon by ~plaintiff. It is undisputed that
the original contract was entered into in October, 1943,
which was substantially as follows:
1. Plaintiff was going to haul certain scrap steel
from the ·Tooele Ordinance Plant to defendant's yard
in Salt Lake City.
2. Plaintiff had the choice of shipping it by rail
or hauling it by truck; in either event the transportation
charges were paid by plaintiff.
3. For this service, defendant was to pay plaintiff
the sum of $2.00 per ton delivered at its yard.
It seems that by January, 1944, plaintiff had loaded
and transported most of the smaller and heavier pieces
of steel which made up heavy cars leaving the trusses.
This fact is demonstrable· hy the description of the materials given by plaintiff ('Tr. 70) and the fact that he
testified that the reason for going to the defendant and
asking if the trusses could be cut up· was because a car
of trusses failed to meet the minimum weight requirements of the railroad. (Tr. 72, 73.) In other words, the
alteration in the agreement made in January, 1944 was
not only at the instance of the plaintiff, but for plaintiff's
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benefit and in the modification or change in the agreeInent, there 'Yas no advantage to defendant. Now, the
tern1s of the alteration seen1 to be rather clear, that is,
that the defendant "~as going to pay plaintiff in addition to the loading and trans~portation charge of $2.00
a ton son1e reasonable amount for cutting up the trusses.
The only dispute seems to be the reasonableness of
the amount which was to bear some relationship to defendant's cost of cutting the trusses in their own yard.
Mr. Rosenblatt for defendant testified, and very clearly,
that when ~fr. Penman came in, he first told him he
didn't think he could cut the trusses out at Tooele any
cheaper than they could be done in the yard. Penman
insisted that he could and then Mr. Rosenblatt told him''I told him he could go ahead and do that cutting and
we would make an extra allowance to him when the job
was finished based on our costs in our own yard.'' (Tr.
103.) In any event, most plaintiff should recover for
cutting the trusses is a reasonable amount.
Defendant maintains that in determining reasonableness the following must be taken into account, first, that
the alteration in the contract was at the instance of the
plaintiff, so that he could load minimum tonnages on
freight cars and avoid paying higher than 65c a ton
transportation charge; second, that human experience
would indicate that a person situated as was defendant would not have voluntarily, and without any consideration, consent to pay more for having a job done
at Tooele than defendant was then and there able and
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actually doing in Salt Lake. Now, let us look at the figures for just a moment. The plaintiff actually p-aid out
by way of money to cut the trusses which he did cut at
Tooele according to his own testimony the following
sums:
Wages for torchmen straight time ....$304.00
Overtime Wages for torchmen____________ 94.50
Wages for day labor---------------------------- 106.40
Overtime for day labor________________________ 4.80
For acetylene gas ------------~:__________________ 133.00
For oxygen gas ------------------------------------ 61.60
In addition thereto claimed for transportation of materials from iSalt
Lake to Tooele even though part
of this was a back haul, after the
delivery of steel under the transportation contact the sum of________ 100.00
TOTAL ________________________________ $804.30
Now, this was the plaintiff's actual expenses according to his own testimony and it may have been higher
than defendant's cost of cutting the same scrap in its
own yard because, first, at the time the agreement was
entered into Mr. Rosenblatt told plaintiff that he thought
it would cost more to cut at Tooele than in defendant's
yard ('Tr. 103) and, second, because plaintiff was not
skilled or experienced in cutting scrap. and preparing it
for re-melting. His business was that of trucking. (Tr.
69.)
Now, by way of contrast, plaintiff sought to have
the court believe £hat the reasonable value of cutting
the trusses at Tooele should be for him to be paid $3.00
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an hour for torehmen instead of the $1.00 he actually
paid. Plaintiff testified that the reasonable value of
cutting \Yas as is hereinbelo'v in Column One set forth,
compared 'Yith his actual cost set forth in Column Two:
Pldintiff Cla.rimed
Wages

Column!
Torchmen-straight time ________________$3.00
Torchmen-over time______________________ 4.50
Common labor-straight time________ 2.00
Common labor-over time______________ 3.00

Wages Actually
Paid by Plaintiff

Collumnll
$1.00
1.50
.80
1.20

The difference in the claim of plaintiff and defendant's
·position accounts for the entire difference between the
amount sued for by plaintiff, to-wit, the sum of $1,658.05
and the amount found by the court as being reasonable
for the services rendered, to-wit, the sum of $804.30.
True enough, plaintiff produced a witness, by name,
Startup, who had had limited experience with torch
operation who attempted to testify that $3.00 per hour
was a reasonable charge.
On the other hand, defendant produced Rufus Erickson, a welder who had been in the business since 1928 ·
(Tr. 88) who testified that he had cut these trusses in
the defendant's yard and had cut off as many as 130
pipes in an eight-hour shift (Tr. 89). That he was paid
at the rate of 95c an hour. He only made five cuts instead
of eight, the five cuts being to sever the tie across the
bottom of the arch. For the purposes of illustration,
let us reduce the problem to one of cuts. Let us reduce
the average number of cuts from 130 trusses that Mr.
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Erickson could do to 100 trusses per eight hour shift.
Then let us increase Mr. Erickson's hourly rate from
95c to $1.00 which plaintiff p·aid his men. We have a
situation something like this. In an eight-hour day, Mr.
Erickson made 500 cuts or 65.5 cuts per hour. Now,
on the 1900 trusses that Mr. Penman claims he cut there
would be a total of eight times that number or 15,200
cuts. Now dividing this by 65.5 we get 232 houts or a
total labor cost of $232.00. The court allowed Mr. Penman $304.00 for this particular item.
So, it is res·pectfully submitted that there was more
than ample testimony to support the findings made by
the court that the actual award made to plaintiff for the
work done there was his cost. His profit should have
come from the advantage to him of being able to load
1ninimum weight cars and thereby keep his freight cost
to a minimum. As a last item, we must call to the court's
attention the fact that a statement was rendered defendant by plaintiff on the 15th day of February, 1944, which
showed that plaintiff was indebted to defendant in the
sun1 of $849.60 and also made mention of the fact that
no allowance had yet been made for cutting the channel
pipe. The ·plaintiff at no time ever submitted a statement to defendant as to what he thought was a reaaonable
amount or how a reasonable amount could be arrived at
and the plaintiff let the matter go until Septemhe·r 25,
1945 or for more than a year and a half before taking
any steps in connection with it at all, and even then made
no written demand upon plaintiff or ever suggested an
amount which was reasonable. It seems ·entirely proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bable that plaintiff·s reason In letting the n1atter go
for so long "Tas because he believed the amount of the
cutting he did 'vas "\Yorth less than the amount $849.60
which he owed defendant and thought it would be well
· •to let. a sleeping dog lie.''
It is respectfully submitted that the findings of
the court are clearly supported by the testimony and
the preponderance thereof and on its merits the case
should be affirmed.
The appellant apparently assigns as error the order
of Judge Hogansen under date of June 16, 1947 denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's ap,peal.
It will be recalled that on May 28, 1947 Judge Hogansen
entered an ex parte order dismissing the appeal and
ordering the ·papers returned fo the clerk of the City
Court. On June 5th a motion to reinstate the appeal and
relieve the defendant of default was served and filed.
The first ground for setting aside the order was that
the order of dismissal had been made without notice
to the defendant. On June 11, 1947, Judge Hogansen
granted the motion to set aside the order of dismissal
on that ground. (Tr. 25.) The only question left goes
to the propriety of Judge Hogansen's order of June 16,
1947 denying ·p·laintiff's Affidavit and Motion filed June
11th asking that the appeal be dismissed. (Tr. 23.) It
will be noted that this Affidavit and Motion and the
entire record fails to show that any notice was given
defendant. The record, however, does show a minute
entry (Tr. 25) that counsel for the defendant was present
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at the time pl~intiff presented and filed the Affidavit
and Motion and that it was agreed to proceed and hear
the n1otion. 'The motion was made pursuant to Section
104-77-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1'943, the pertinent part
of ,vhich is as follows: ''An ap,peal may he dismissed,
on notice, in the discretion of the court, for any of the
following causes : ( 1) 'That the papers were not filed
in the district court and the advance fee required therefor
paid within thirty days after the transcript was received
by the clerl{. '' Now, for an understanding of the problem, we must also refer to the manner of taking an
appeal from the City Court. Section 104-77-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943 referring to the appeal, says: ''The
a·ppeal shall be taken by filing a notice thereof with the
justice, or in the clerk's office of the district court to
which the appeal is taken and serving a copy on the adverse party.'' In the case at bar, the notice was captioned
and filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County and copy was served upon plaintiff. Section 104-77-5 Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides: "Upon
filing the notice of a'ppeal and undertaking required in
the next succeeding section, or up:on receivim.g notice
fr~om t'he cZerk of t:he district coU+rt that the appeal has
been filed and perfected in the clerk's office and the payment of the fees of the justice for making the transcript,
the justice shall within five days transmit to the clerketc.'' Now what happ.ened in this rna tter is set forth
i~ the affidavit in support of a motion to reinstate ap~
peal (Tr. 18, 19} where affiant says: "That on or about
the 7th day of Feburary, 1947, he filed on behalf of said
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defendant notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal-.
tha.t on said February 7, 1947, he tendered to the clerk
of the district court of the Third Judicial Distric.t in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah check in payment
of statutory filing fee of said appeal; that the clerk then
and there refused to accept said check because the record
in the City Court of Salt Lake ·City had not been filed; that
said notice and undertaking on appeal were left with
the clerk of said court with the understanding that when
the c.lerk received the record from the clerk of the ·city
Court the attorneys for defendant would be notified and
the payment of fees would then be made.''
The affidavit continues to the effect that no noticH
of any nature was ever given by the clerk of the City
Court that the record on appeal had been received in the
clerk's office. It is noted that under Section 104-77-5
there is no time specified, in which the clerk of the district court, after receiving notice of appeal and undertaking, must notify the clerk of the City ·court, so herein we have a complete hiatus, in which not only several
days but several months could elapse before the clerk
of the C~ty Court is notified and before the transcript
on appeal ~s forwarded to the clerk of the District Court.
In the case of
Christenslern v. Christensen, 173 Pac. 383, Utah
1918,
the statement of facts disclose that the notice of
appeal was filed with the clerk of the District Court
on the 22nd day of December, 1917 and the record on
appeal was not filed with the clerk of the District Court
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until the 9th day of February, 1918.
It is quite apparent that the designers and drafters
in the code of civil procedure in the State of Utah have
endeavored to devise a scheme by which the party with
knowledge of the facts must advise the other party before
any advantage can be taken of that fact: witness, requirem·ent for serving notices of court action upon demurers, motions, etc., when the opposing party is not
p·resent, requirements of serving notice of judgment,
cost bills, notices of appeal, etc. In this instance, however, the burden is upon the appellant from the City
Court or Justice's Court to determine when the transcript on appeal from the Justice's or City Court is received in the District Court, and we recognize there is
no legal justification for relying upon the promise of the
clerk to notify you when it is received, but it does seem
to be a perfectly human thing to do.
Section 104-77-9 above cited supra. clearly makes it
discretionary with the court as to whether a cause may be
dismissed for failing to pay the fee within thirty days
after the transcript is received by the clerk. The sentence
uses the word "may" be dismissed and also says in the
''discretion'' of the court. The court in the case of
Benson v. Ritchie, 230 Pac. 572, 64 Utah 278,
,Utah 1924,
in passing upon this same section said ''No doubt some
discretion is vested in the District Court for the reason
that a motion to dismiss an ap~peal may be interpos·ed
on the 31st day after the papers have been received by
the clerk, and it may be made to appear while such is
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the fact, there, nevertheless is some good and legal cause
·w·hy the fee was not paid strictly within the thirty days
or that there is some other valid reason why the appeal
should not be dismissed. ' ' In the case of
Little v. B~ank, 87 Pac. 708, 31 Utah 222,
Utah 1906,
cited by appellant the court recognized that an adequate
excuse would justify the court in refusing to deny a
motion to dismiss wher·e the court said at th·e end of
the opinion ''at least there is no adequate ·excuse offered
as to why these things were not done within the time
the law requires they shall be done. Under these circumstances, we do not think it was an abuse of discretion on the part of the court in dismissing the appeal.''
We believe, as counsel for the defendant, that w,e
have read all of the Utah cases which have construed or
dealt in any way with the section under consideration
and aside from those dealing with jurisdiction, the appellate court has in all instances seen fit to affirm the discretion of the trial court. There is no adequate record
of the proceedings which occurred before the trial judge
relative to the argument and discussion surrounding
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. The following
can only be suggested from the record: The complaint
was filed Sepitember 27, 1945, the answer and counterclaim January 10, 1946. No trial date was fixed until
January 24, 1947, over a year after the case was at issue.
And also that although defendant's motion to dismiss was
denied June 16, and notice of that fact given to plaintiff
on June 17, still no demand for trial was made until
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October 15, 1947, so clearly there is nothing in the record
to indicate that plaintiff was in any hurry to get the case
dis,posed of or that any prejudice· occurred to plaintiff
by reason of the delay caused by defendant failing to discover that the record on appeal had been transmitted
from the clerk of the City ;Court to the Clerk o~ the District Court.
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment ar·e well
founded and supported in the testimony and clearly by
the great pre~ponderance thereof. Plaintiff has failed to
show any abuse of discretion by the District Court in
denying his motion to dismiss. It. is r:e:Spectfully submitted that the judgment should be affirm,ed.

Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MoFFAT

&

MABEY,

Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

